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Abstract
This is an essay in the sociology of knowledge. It aims to demon-
strate, firstly, how development institutions construct rural society
in terms of organizational imperatives, and secondly, how these ‘con-
structions’ come to be underpinned by social theory. The focus is on
irrigation in south India and colonial and contemporary state policy
initiatives to promote local institutions for the community manage-
ment of decentralized resource systems. The essay presents the
social and historical origin of an important and powerful set of con-
temporary policy ideas. The significance of this lies in the continuing
misperception of local institutions of resource management, and in
particular the systematic isolation of resource management from its
particular social and historical context.
Introduction
This paper concerns the ideology and practice of ‘community man-
agement’ in the planned development of common property
1 This paper is a spin-off from some more detailed historical and anthropological
work in progress. It is a preliminary exploration of the relationship between develop-
ment ideas and institutions which will, no doubt, be qualified or substantiated by evid-
ence from further field and archival work. The research on which the paper draws is
supported by a Fellowship from the Economic and Social Research Council under the
Global Environmental Change Programme (Grant No. L320273065) and by a grant
from the Ford Foundation (New Delhi). I am grateful to the Centre for Water
Resources (Anna University, Madras), the Madras Institute of Development Studies
and the NGO Pradan (Madurai) for their support. An extended version of this paper
was presented at the International Conference on The Political Economy of Water
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resources. Specifically, it deals with ideas about village institutions
of minor irrigation management in Tamil Nadu and interventions
with which they are associated. Although focal to recent thinking
on common property development, these ideas have a history which
stretches back to the initial days of colonial rule in the early 19th
century. There are some striking continuities over this long period.
Underlying these is the perhaps well-known tendency of agencies—
colonial governments or development projects—to conceive of rural
society in terms which are appropriate to given programme and
administrative systems. In particular, ideologies of village organiza-
tion have long served a bureaucratic need to simplify and universal-
ize local social systems, most broadly, ‘to organise the mass, to
change an undifferentiated and unreliable citizenry into a struc-
tured, readily accessible public’ (Selznick 1949, cited in Robertson
1984: 140).
Obviously over time, the social theory employed has changed.
The colonial government in India formalized, generalized and (as
I shall argue) in some respects invented the ‘custom’ and ‘tradi-
tion’ of village communities as a basis for minor irrigation admin-
istration. Contemporary irrigation management practice while
inheriting many notions of community tradition, employs its own
generalizing models which (often drawing on institutional theory)
emphasize local irrigation institutions as self-managed organiza-
tional solutions to problems of task fulfilment and the distribution
of material benefits (cf., Uphoff 1986, Curtis 1991, Ostrom 1990,
1992). In this paper I shall argue that the legitimate need to
generalize ‘design principles’ for farmer-controlled irrigation here,
no less than the colonial administration’s use of ‘custom’, involves
an institutional isolation of resource management from its particu-
lar historical and social context, and in doing so overlooks the
importance of political relations and the cultural construction of
natural resources.
Among the more influential ideas shaping rural development
interventions today is the notion that, if given unambiguous and
secure rights of access and use, communities are better managers
of the natural resources upon which they depend for their livelihoods
than are state bureaucracies. This argument is increasingly applied
to non-private environmental resources such as forests, grazing land
in South Asia, in Madras (5–8 January 1995), I particularly wish to acknowledge the
contribution of discussion during that conference to the redrafting of the paper.
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or irrigation water, whose degradation centralized resource manage-
ment systems have appeared powerless to control. Many programmes
in these sectors are therefore working towards ‘joint’ or ‘community’
management regimes in which the state machinery (departments of
forestry, public works, etc.) transfers resource management respons-
ibilities to local farmers (e.g., IIMI & WUHEE 1994; Poffenberger
1990). It is the construction of community in the context of policies
of resource management transfer which is the subject of this paper.
While communities are considered as likely to be better man-
agers of local resources, an underlying and equally influential
contemporary policy idea is that present levels of resource
degradation are in significant measure the result of the ‘dissolution
of traditional institutional arrangements’ for sustainable resource
use (Bromley & Cernea 1989:iii). In some recent analyses, inter-
vention by the state (and particularly the colonial state’s assertion
of proprietary rights over non-private resources, such as water and
forests) is seen as the principal cause of the demise of traditional
systems of sustainable resource use (e.g., Gadgil & Guha 1992).
But, even if the state is not viewed as directly responsible for this
dissolution, it is often held that national governments have failed
to substitute for indigenous resource management regimes
(Bromley & Cernea 1989:iii), the demise of which has led to the
damaging shift towards uncontrolled ‘open access’ to non-private
resources. The policy solution to this problem involves the (re-)
establishment of local users’ rights and the building up of ‘forms
of social organization conducive to sustainable productive use of
natural resources’ (ibid. iv). This usually translates into pro-
grammes of local ‘institution building’ and the promotion of spe-
cial purpose local organizations: village water users’ associations,
forest protection committees and the like. Linked to the idea of
the dissolution of traditional systems, these programmes are, not
uncommonly, built around the powerful ideology of recovery of ‘tra-
ditional’ community institutions of resource management.
The focus of this paper is on ‘tank’ irrigation systems in Tamil
Nadu, and state (and latterly NGO) programmes for their restora-
tion. Through this example, I will examine the history of ideas of
‘community management’, and show that contemporary concern
with the dissolution of traditional tank management systems, and
ideas of community management, farmer control and management
transfer more generally, are not recent but are rooted and have their
origin in the exigencies of colonial administration in the nineteenth
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century. I will then suggest that today’s development agencies also
selectively endorse particular social theories in constructing a rural
society which is manageable in terms of present policy goals and
administrative constraints.2 I want to make it quite clear, however,
at the outset, that my argument is not about the merits or otherwise
of policies of irrigation management transfer or local institutional
development. (I do happen to believe that in many ways these offer
the best—perhaps only—hope for improving water resources
management). Neither is my argument to be read as an evaluation
of the contribution of economic-institutional theories of collective
action. Rather, my concern with the relationship between organiza-
tional interests and social theory within colonial and contemporary
policy discourse and with the selective representations of rural soci-
ety which this generates.
Tank Systems and Decline
A tank is a manmade reservoir created by a simple earthen construc-
tion (the ‘bund’) that captures surface run-off. Water is distributed
to fields below the tank by gravity flow through a variable number of
sluices. The nature of drainage often links individual tanks into local
‘chains’, and to perennial or temporary rivers and streams (Mosse
1997a, 1977c). The broader concept of the ‘tank system’ includes
these wider linkages as well as the relationship of tanks to catchment
areas, and to groundwater supply. Tanks therefore have a range of
functions beyond irrigation (percolation and groundwater recharge,
flood control, silt capture etc.) and are affected by changes in the
wider resources ‘complex’, including changes in land use, cropping
patterns etc. (Ambler 1992). By any reckoning, the very large
number of tanks in Tamil Nadu (around 39,000) have, in recent
years, declined in importance in both relative and absolute terms.
The expansion of canal, but especially well irrigation (in the 1960s
and 70s) has shifted tanks from the position they occupied, even in
the early 1970s, as the single largest mode of irrigation in the state.
But there has also been a long-term decline in the area under tank
irrigation in absolute terms. In all districts many tanks are physically
2 Elsewhere I have shown how the development discourse of community can also
legitimize new claims on resources by disadvantaged groups (Mosse 1997b, cf. Li
1996).
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in disrepair, they are silted up, encroached upon, their sluices are
inoperable, and bunds and weirs are damaged (see MIDs 1986, Vaid-
yanathan 1992).
The reasons for tank decline are complex and historically specific.
Adequate treatment of them is well beyond the scope of the present
paper. They include factors associated with deforestation (from the
late 18th century), decline in the reliability of water supply, popula-
tion growth, intensified land use and crop regimes, siltation and
encroachment onto tank beds, colonial revenue systems which penal-
ized investment in paddy land, an increase in individualized water
control through the use of private wells and the inadequacy of state
investments.3 However, a particularly pervasive diagnosis of the
problem in official circles, as well as among observers, has long been
that a ‘traditional’ system of resource mobilisation, maintenance and
repair has collapsed, and that traditions and skills have been lost.
Such analysis points in particular to the ‘erosion of the autonomous
functioning of village management systems’ (Vani 1992:9, emphasis
added).
This is not, however, a new observation. It is true that today,
underlying tank development programmes, there is a notion that the
history of tank decline is the history of the incursion of the colonial
state into traditional village institutions, but early 19th century
English East India Company officers saw decaying village tank sys-
tems as sign of the administrative and moral disorder of the regimes
which they had come to replace. Tank systems have, in fact, been
interpreted as being in a state of decline, neglect and disrepair wher-
ever they have been described. The historical identification of ‘tradi-
tional’ village systems and the moment of their collapse is no simple
task. It involves a seemingly endless journey back in time. Thus, the
decisive moment of loss is variously located in: the present govern-
ment’s neglect of indigenous knowledge and traditions, in the
1960s–70s green revolution expansion of capitalist agriculture and
groundwater irrigation; in changes brought about in the 1950s fol-
lowing Independence (e.g. the abolition of Zamindari estates and
the establishment of structures of local government); in the colonial
commercialization of dry land agriculture in the late 19th and early
20th centuries; in the centralization of colonial government and the
3 See discussions in: Djurfeldt and Lindberg 1975; Elumalai 1982; Harriss 1982;
Granda 1984:354; Ludden 1985, 1979; Meinzen-Dick 1984, 1989; Vaidyanathan
1992; Mukundan 1988; Palanisami 1981; Palanisami and Easter 1984:29; Palanis-
ami et al. 1994; Rajanam Rao 1891; Sivanappan 1982.
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building of a technocratic irrigation bureaucracy from 1850; in the
consolidation of British power, its revenue systems and property law
by the 1840s; in the dismantling of the south Indian ‘old regimes’
around 1800; in the wars of the immediate pre-colonial period of the
1790s; in the neglect of decentralized systems under Mohammedan
rule during the 18th century; in the disruption generated by the rise
of the Vijayanagar empire in south India after 1350; in the collapse
of the 10th century Chola empire and its system of locality and vil-
lage government, and so it goes on.4 Tracing ‘traditional’ tank sys-
tems is strongly reminiscent of Raymond Williams’ literary pursuit
of the old order of rural England—an exercise which he likened to
stepping onto a backward moving escalator: the timeless rural com-
munity is always just over the last hill (Williams 1973, discussed in
Spencer 1990:140). Like the ideal rural order of which they are a
part, tank systems never simply change, they decay (ibid.). Indeed, a
pervasive image is one in which social and political forces acting on
tank complexes do not constitute, underpin, reproduce or extend
these systems, they simply erode, dissolve or undermine them. The
point is that village tank management systems and their decline are
not so much historical as ideological phenomena. Further, as ideolo-
gies of community management, traditional tank institutions are
constructed in historically specific ways and have provided legitimiz-
ing charters for different development regimes.
Kudimaramat: ‘Villager Repairs’ and the Colonial
Construction of Community Management
The idea of autonomous village irrigation management or mainten-
ance systems, in one form or another, has provided a key element in
tank development policy in south India for over a hundred years. The
reason is, not least, because of the insurmountable administrative
problems and financial burden government faces in the work of
maintaining tens of thousands of tanks which, as one 19th century
British engineer commented, is ‘at once too large in the aggregate,
too small in detail—as well in fact [as to] attempt to keep every hut
4 These various interpretations come from a very large number of sources.
Among some of the more recent are Djurfeldt and Lindberg 1977; Palanı´sami and
Easter 1983, Ludden 1985, Vani 1992, Harriss 1982, Granda 1984, Sarada Raju
1941.
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in the country in repair’.5 The colonial government of the time
needed ‘traditional’ autonomous village tank institutions for its
public works administration, just as it needed ‘traditional’ village
headmen for the organization of its revenue system. Where these
appeared no longer to exist they had to be re-invented. Indeed, the
Madras Public Works Commission of 1869–70, and successive com-
missions of enquiry during the remainder of the 19th century went
to considerable lengths to amass evidence to prove the existence
of village institutions of tank maintenance and communal labour,
generally referred to as kudimaramat, ‘villager repair or maintenance
works’.6 This effort was prompted by a growing perception
(supported by reports from the districts) that a large proportion of
tanks in many regions were in a state of disrepair, and that the
burden of their repair could no longer be ignored by the government
in favour of investment in the more productive larger irrigation
works (cf. Mukundan 1988:12). Not only did the failure of minor
irrigation systems represent a loss of revenue, but, in the 1870s and
80s, it contributed to an environmental crisis which had played its
part in generating famine on a massive scale. In the Commission
reporting on Famine of 1877–78, which cost an estimated 1.35 mil-
lion lives in Madras and Mysore, the colonial government admitted
for the first time its moral obligation to maintain minor irrigation.
Government not only increased its sponsorship of tank repair, but
also insisted on its overriding right to own and control local water
resources in the public interest—hence the origin of irrigation law
in Madras. By this time also the Ryotwari revenue settlement had
turned irrigation commons into state property (cf. Sengupta
1995:7). As the state bureaucratized irrigation administration and
extended its own proprietorial right over water resources—and as a
new centralized and technically specialized Public Works Depart-
ment (PWD) gained ascendancy over the decentralized and general-
ist Revenue Department in tank matters—the Madras government’s
5 A statement made in 1868 by Maj. R.H. Sankey, then Chief Engineer in Mysore
State, cited in Vani 1992:89.
6 The term kudimaramat is a composite of the Tamil kuti—‘inhabitant’, ‘subject’,
and the Arabic maramat—‘repairs’. It appears in the records only after the 1860s,
and remains, even today, largely unknown in rural areas. Deliberations on kudimara-
mat occupied the major Commissions on Public Works (1869–70), Famine (1880)
and Irrigation (1901–03) and filled the proceedings of the Board of Revenue and
Public Works for over thirty years. They are reviewed and analysed in a book in
preparation (Mosse, in preparation). There were comparable colonial debates in
north Indian canal irrigation maintenance (Gilmartin 1994: 1134, 1137).
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efforts to constitute ‘customary’ village institutions as the basis for
local resource management also increased.7
State programmes of tank repair and improvement, such as the
Tank Restoration Scheme (TRS) started in 1883 and continued until
very recently, were firmly premised upon villager maintenance and
upkeep of smaller tanks (the majority, irrigating under 200 acres)
‘according to the old custom of the country known as kudi-maramat,8
and the transfer of tanks to villagers for management. Despite
increasing reports of the collapse of kudimaramat—especially from the
more precarious areas of rainfed tanks—the members of the 1901–
03 Irrigation Commission were ‘reluctant to admit that so valuable
an institution is really dead and past restoration’.9
The colonial government did not, as is often supposed, take over
and undermine an institution (kudimaramat) belonging to the people.
Rather the PWD and the Madras government defined, ordered, gen-
eralized, in short, invented a village tradition in the image of the
state’s planned irrigation administration. The problem was not the
nineteenth century colonial erosion of irrigation tradition so much
as its invention as a solution to the administrative demands which a
decentralized resource system placed on an increasingly centralized
state. Indeed, for tank systems, ‘traditional’ community management
was the corollary of state power not its inverse.
7 I overlook, here, significant differences within British government administra-
tion, notably between the decentralized Revenue administration and the new cent-
ralized technical departments of Public Works, Forestry and so forth, formed in the
late nineteenth century. David Gilmartin (1994), for example, brings out a sharp
contrast between, on the one hand, the social scientific discourse of early revenue
settlement officers, which incorporated idioms of custom and genealogy into a new
legal and administrative language of the colonial state—the ‘science of empire’—
and, on the other, the ascendant technical, universal discourse of irrigation sci-
ence—‘imperial science’. In Madras, too, the ‘imperial science’ of the Public Works
Department displaced a ‘local knowledge’ including the set of ‘rights and customs’
through which local revenue administration operated. Indeed, the Madras PWD was
founded upon a rejection of the sort of local authority, rights and privileges into
which revenue administration was moulded, and the establishment of a scientific
administration based upon principles of technical efficiency. However, by the 1870s,
the PWD was forced to confront insuperable problems and costs associated with its
attempt to impose ‘imperial science’ onto decentralized tank systems (as against
large canal systems), and with its disregard of the earlier nexus linking local rights
and privileges to colonial administration. In fact, as argued here, from the 1870s,
the PWD took the lead in reinventing ‘community’, but now in terms of a centralized
technical administrative system rather that the earlier revenue system.
8 Report of the Indian Famine Commission, Part II, ‘Measures of Protection and
Prevention’. Parliamentary Papers Vol. L11, 1880 (India Office Library).
9 Report of the Indian Irrigation Commission (1901–03), Part II, Provincial, p. 112.
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The manner in which kudimaramat was ‘re-created’ as a tradi-
tional autonomous village institution provides an illustrative case of
the way in which (at least by the late nineteenth century) the ‘auto-
nomous village community’ was constituted as the basis for colonial
administration more generally (Ludden 1993); and the way in which
rural society was ordered, reified, statistically recorded, administrat-
ively controlled and fundamentally changed. Through its commissions
and reports, the government became the repository of authoritative
and empirical knowledge on local irrigation custom and practice
(ibid.). While reports from the districts evidenced a wide diversity of
local practice and officers’ opinion on systems of tank maintenance,
it was central definitions which determined policy. Indeed, despite
appearances, the bureaucratic notion of kudimaramat was, in fact,
quite independent of the actual record of village-level social systems
of tank management. But then, these were never really examined
in themselves anyway (Sengupta 1985:1933). Rather, kudimaramat
notions derived exclusively from observations on the physical con-
sequences of custom or, more usually, its absence—i.e., tank disrepair.
From 1882 a large establishment was set up to survey tanks and
produce on them a centralized and uniform set of records as the
basis for state involvement. These surveys defined (and continue to
define) tanks as physical systems and specified for each an engineering
‘standard of efficiency’. This record, at the same time, determined
an officially approved standard for ‘customary’ community systems
of maintenance: that custom which must have existed to operate the
system efficiently. ‘The term kudimaramat’, wrote the Board of Rev-
enue in 1876, ‘shall be held to include all the works . . . enumerated
in the Board’s Standing Order No. 54’—a fixed list of customary
tank maintenance practice.10 Guided by this standard, an empirical
and official record of villagers’ customary obligation for tank main-
tenance in each village—the Kudimaramat Dittum—was to form
part of the official records of a village and would provide an authorit-
ative guide in cases of dispute.11
The kudimaramat tradition of official discourse was constructed
so as to satisfy two administrative imperatives. Firstly, diverse local
irrigation maintenance practice was empirically ‘fixed’ and rendered
as a generalized standard, and this was set by engineering standards
10 Proceedings of the Board of Revenue No. 1192, 6 May 1876 (Tamil Nadu
State Archives, Madras).
11 ‘Bill for the Enforcement of Kudimaramat in the Presidency of Madras’,
Appendix E. Public Works Commission 1870 (Tamil Nadu State Archives).
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of efficiency. Secondly, the government’s demands on villager labour,
resources and management acquired the legitimacy of custom. The
extension of state power which lay behind this regimentation of ‘local
knowledge’ (Ludden 1992) and invention of tradition was hardly dis-
guised. The codification of community obligations served as a means
to extend central government control of tank resources by ensuring
a new (as we shall see legal) accountability of villagers to government
(Vani 1992:55).12
As an invented village tradition, however, kudimaramat was in
dissolution from the moment it came into being (compare Mayer
1993:386). The bureaucratically constituted kudimaramat set a pub-
lished and approved ‘standard’ against which enough cases of local
practice failed to measure up for the notion of the collapse of local
custom—that kudimaramat was in decline or had ceased to exist—
to gain wide currency.13 Perceiving a collapse of customary obliga-
tions, the government turned to law. The Commissioners on Public
Works, Irrigation and Famine and the Board of Revenue, were all
convinced of the expediency of legislation ‘to give permanence to
existing organisations . . . [where the system of ‘kudimaramat’ is
already in force] and of reviving it where it has fallen into deseu-
tude’.14 Indeed, more than anything else kudimaramat became a con-
cept of legal obligation bound by the nineteenth century British judi-
cial ‘norm of universal applicability’ (Price 1991:117). Beginning
with the Madras Compulsory Labour Act (1858) (known as the Kudi-
maramat Act) government took a series of steps to enforce commun-
ity maintenance of tanks and customary labour by law.15 Several
12 The central bureaucratic invention of tradition, here, is to be distinguished
from the earlier ‘social scientific discourse’ which underpinned British revenue set-
tlement and administration in the early nineteenth century (cf. Gilmartin 1994).
Through the latter, revenue officials explicitly recognized (or established) local
rights and authority in tank systems. Kudimaramat was a quite different ‘tradition’,
which in fact, met with much opposition from district revenue officers (Mosse, in
preparation).
13 There may have been other reasons for this also. Through farmer petitions,
government attention was likely to have been disproportionately drawn to those
tanks which needed repair and in which maintenance systems had failed (Sengupta
1991); and where, in consequence, government engineers would have experienced
problems in generating community involvement and mobilising unpaid labour.
14 Proceedings of the Board of Revenue No. 1, 192, 6 May 1876.
15 The government was undecided as to whether kudimaramat was essentially a
system of voluntary or forced labour (Matthai 1915:9–125), although the Compuls-
ory Labour Act of 1858 undoubtedly put into place the practice of corvee labour
(Ambler 1993:4). This coercion of labour in public works was at times justified with
reference to traditional village or high caste rights over untouchable labour (Ludden
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Kudimaramat Bills were drafted (1869, 1883) to underwrite custom
with the force of law. Not surprisingly, the Act failed and the bill
was dropped because enforcement of the law depended upon the
impossible task of proving in court that kudimaramat was customary
practice in any particular village.
Community involvement in irrigation management as a ‘develop-
ment’ policy idea, therefore, had its origins in the organisational
problem which tank systems presented to an increasingly centralized
public works bureaucracy in the second half on the 19th century.
Kudimaramat (i.e., generalized custom backed by law) was not a
descriptive category of village-level collective action but an ideolo-
gical instrument enabling the assertion of state control (over water),
while delimiting state obligations. This was required, particularly
after the 1850s, as the government of Madras defined for itself a
new and bureaucratic independence from older networks of local
power and authority of the pre-colonial regimes through which an
earlier generation of East India Company revenue officers had oper-
ated. With this disengagement from local political structures, the
newly centralized government (represented locally by PWD
engineers) experienced the failure of its own authority over tank
maintenance, and the loss of its earlier ability to command labour
for tank repair works.
The picture of kudimaramat as an invented tradition is consistent
wth some recent historical analyses which suggest a reversal of earl-
ier perceptions. As David Washbrook succinctly puts it, instead of
British rule and the forces of Western capitalism eroding the static
society of village communities, ‘we have moved towards views of a
highly mobile and economically-differentiated society rendered sta-
tionary and ‘‘traditional’’ by the processes of ‘‘peasantisation’’ impli-
cit in the colonial project’ (1993: 68). And as other studies have
demonstrated, this ‘fixing’ of rural society involved an isolation of
village ‘traditions’—for example those of caste, jajmani, or temple
worship—from wider political structures which was, in a more gen-
eral sense, both a political and an ideological imperative of British
rule in India (see Dirks 1987, Ludden 1993, Fuller 1989, Stein 1989,
Mayer 1993). Thus, much of ‘traditional’ village India is now under-
1985:174). Ironically, the officers ‘extrapolated from the village to the government’,
rights over labour formerly held by dominant land-owning castes, but which had
been rendered illegal by anti-slavery legislation (ibid., Mayer 1993:363).
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stood as a product of colonial government which, in rather complex
ways, truncated, transformed and reifed the wider set of dynamic
political relations of the pre-colonial state which had earlier defined
institutions of caste, temple and, I argue, resource management.
Colonial constructions of autonomous village-level water manage-
ment traditions, exemplified by kudimaramat, were also a concomit-
ant of political changes which isolated tank systems from regional
political structures, reconceiving them in localized, traditionalized
and bureaucratic terms (cf. Washbrook 1988). Despite these insights
from historical analysis, ‘steady-state’ models of rural society con-
tinue to hold dominance within contemporary irrigation develop-
ment discourse (see below).
As I have shown elsewhere there are, in fact, good reasons for
believing that pre-colonial tank irrigation systems, certainly in the
plains areas where this form of irrigation dominated agriculture,
were not resourced, maintained and operated by autonomous village
institutions, but by a wider set of political relations of the decentral-
ized, or ‘segmentary’ (Stein 1980) pre-colonial state (Mosse 1997a,
n.d. in preparation). Evidence on these pre-colonial systems of
resource management, however, eschews environmental romanti-
cism: they rested on an inequitable social order, were underpinned
by political systems which generated conflict, plunder and the
destruction of tanks systems (Lardinois 1989:24–5, 38–43), as well
as their protection, repair and extension through royal grants, lar-
gesse and patronage (Dirks 1987) and did not therefore always
ensure investments adequate to keep tanks in order. Nonethless,
(and in ways which cannot be detailed here) these political systems
generated resource flows and defined authoritative positions, rights
and obligations which operated supra-village mechanisms for the
construction, maintenance and integration of interlinked tank sys-
tems (ibid.: 148). Indeed, investment in and the operation of tank
systems was indissolubly linked to legitimate political overlordship,
and my own ethnohistorical work (in Sivagangai and Ramnad) estab-
lishes a persisting link between systems of caste honour and tank
irrigation works in the articulation of authority at the level of village,
micro-region and kingdom.16
16 The mass of litigation during the 19th and early 20th century over water rights
which erupted in this area (through newly established courts) only underscores the
significance of ‘higher authority’ in establishing local water rights and arbitrating
disputes (cf. Ludden 1985:89–90, Mosse 1997a, n.d. in preparation).
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This system of ‘segmentary’ political relations was not suddenly
terminated by the arrival in the Tamil countryside of the British
(East India Company). Company revenue officials, in fact, ‘settled
into existing functioning networks of state power and authority’
(Ludden 1985:128–9) through which they effected the tank repair
necessary to secure continuing revenue flows. Nonetheless, govern-
ment reforms from the 1850s were highly critical of these accom-
modations to existing authoritarian structures, and gradually put in
place a centralized public works machinery separate from revenue.
As Gilmartin puts it, the ‘science of empire’ gave way to ‘imperial
science’ (see footnote no. 8). The impact of British rule on tank
systems is complex and beyond the scope of the present essay. Suffice
it to say that the more centralized revenue and administrative sys-
tems initiated by its Mogul predecessors, but finally put into place
by Company raj (Washbrook 1988, Stein 1985), gradually dissolved
segmentary political relations, and broke up earlier resource flows
and the ‘existing circuit of investment and social reproduction which
had long obtained under pre-colonial regimes’ (Stein 1985:412). On
the one hand ‘honours and local position could no longer be secured
through the integrated relation of community benefaction and pat-
ronage, [and instead] local magnates began to invest . . . in new eco-
nomic opportunities afforded by colonial trade’. (Dirks 1987:357,
emphasis added); and on the other hand, as Washbrook argues,
authority and social position no longer required such benefaction. In
other words, British rule, in various ways, emancipated local political
chiefs and big men from the obligation to invest in community
resources and public institutions such as tank systems (Washbrook
1976:332, 1988:92). The shortfall was not made good by the govern-
ment’s own public works.
If tank systems declined under colonial rule, then, it was the result
of this isolation of resource management from the wider political
relations through which it had been organized and not, as is widely
believed, because of an ‘erosion of the autonomous functioning of
village management systems’ (Vani 1992:9). No longer, sustained
by the wider political system which made them operable, tank sys-
tems did indeed fragment into the autonomous village systems
which, by the end of the 19th century, they were widely percieved
traditionally to have been. On the one hand village-based tank insti-
tutions were created as part of a ‘social system decapitated by colo-
nial rule’ (Dirks 1987:8); while on the other these local traditions—
which the government later recorded and reifed as kudimaramat
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custom—were manifestly failing to invest in and maintain many tank
systems. The ‘creation’ of traditional village institutions of tank
maintenance on which the government’s own public works machinery
had come to depend, and their apparently widespread dissolution
were both products of the same political changes effected by colonial
rule.17 Moreover, the very Western engineering science which
invested and defined kudimaramat custom also disregarded, limited
or constantly interfered with local farmer-managed irrigation sys-
tems (IIMI/IMA 1995:5).
This is not to say that tank systems universally collapsed. The vast
majority of tanks manifestly continued to function. Indeed, the ideo-
logy of decline until recently concealed from public view local water
management systems, which were sustained by the demands of agri-
culture and underpinned by localized authority (Mosse 1997a, forth-
coming-a, Sengupta 1985, 1991). However, it would be equally wrong
to conclude that these local systems (often restricted to supply channel
maintenance and water distribution) represent enduring autonomous
village traditions persisting unchanged by wider political and eco-
nomic transformations. Indeed this separation of irrigation systems
(water rights, maintenance obligations) from political authority was
precisely the achievement—ideological, legal (through property law)
and empirical—of colonial government. In substituting village custom
(backed by law) for segmentary political authority, the ideology of kud-
imaramat both rejected and concealed the role and obligation of political
authority, including that of the colonial government, in tank manage-
ment, investment and repair. As a product of ‘orientalist empiricism’
(Ludden 1993) kudimaramat was ‘a set of ‘‘factualised’’ statements
[about village irrigation] detached epistemologically from colonial
politics’ (Breckenridge and van de Veer 1993:8). In the next section I
suggest that such ‘orientalist’ constructions of community irrigation
management continue to shape development policy ideas today.
In sum then, after 1850, a newly centralized colonial system not only
required an institutionalized conception of local practice, but also
required that it had the legitimacy of ‘custom’. Moreover, legislation
on community participation in irrigation was premised on the experi-
ence of its absence. At any rate, subsequent government interven-
tion—including a series of irrigation bills from 1906 to 1934–36
attempting to codify further community contributions under an
17 For a similar argument applied to the jajmani system as a ‘traditional’ village-
based system of exchange of goods and services, see Fuller 1989a, Fuller 1989b and
Mayer 1993.
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increasingly centralized irrigation administration (Mukundan
1988:15–18)—only served to accelerate or confirm its demise. A cess
(tax) on irrigated land to cover tank maintenance gradually replaced
the idea of enforcing labour and when (in the 1930s) this was incorpor-
ated into land taxes, the government’s ability to legitimize claims on
villager labour, resources and management through ‘custom’ was
finally undermined. While attempts to promote community involve-
ment through the enforcement of custom by direct acts of law were
abandoned in the 20th century, the same function was given to village
panchayats widely constituted by the 1920s. By then the powerful notion
of traditional village self-government and its decline was well estab-
lished as a justification for state intervention in community organiza-
tions.18 Panchayat law began to order certain regulatory activities
related to tank irrigation, such as water distribution, which were hardly
touched in kudimaramat Acts (Vani 1992). Like kudimaramat law,
panchayats were burdened with carrying government’s principles of
resource management—that is the extension of community obliga-
tions but the retention of state rights. Indeed, the bureaucratization of
rural institutions and the development contradiction of state directed
community self-help, continued to bedevil the major post-
Independence initiatives of Community Development and Panchayat
Raj (see Jain 1985). Meanwhile, kudimaramat now officially under-
stood more narrowly as farmer contributions to government-initiated
works, was defined in various government orders in terms of a propor-
tional sharing of maintenance costs between government and farmers
(e.g., 40:60 in 1963, 4:3 in 1974). At the same time, the Panchayat
Unions (local government) which became responsible for all smaller
tanks irrigating less than one hundred acres undertook kudimaramat
work themselves and attempted to recover the cost of this ‘customary’
villager work from farmers (IIMI/IIMA 1995:10).
Water Users’ Associations (WUAs): From Tradition to
Collective Action19
As suggested at the outset of this paper, irrigation policy today is
once again focusing on village management systems for tank opera-
18 e.g., The Report of the Local Self Government Committee in Madras (1882)
(India Office Library).
19 I am especially grateful for the contributions of Richard Palmer-Jones, Geof
Wood, Peter Mollinga and David Ludden at the Madras conference on the Political
Economy of Water in South Asia, which have significantly influenced the re-drafting
of this section of the paper.
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tion, maintenance and repair. During the 1980s and 90s, for
example, major investments in Tamil Nadu tanks have been made
under an EEC-funded programme of tank development. Originally
conceived as a Public Works Department engineering venture to
repair tank bunds, sluices and line field channels,20 this programme
currently gives emphasis to the establishment of farmers’ or water
users’ associations (WUAs) (IMTI 1993b). Following models
developed in the Philippines, this aspect of the programme has been
piloted in a small number of tanks by the Centre for Water
Resources (CWR) of Anna University (Madras) with support for the
Ford Foundation. This experiment is part of a national (and
international) move towards ‘participatory irrigation management’
(PIM) or ‘irrigation management transfer (IMT). There is no single
PIM or IMT model within India and different states are presently
evolving their own approaches (Brewer & Raju 1995). This is a com-
plex and rapidly changing subject well beyond the scope and purpose
of the present discussion which is limited to identifying some con-
tinuities between contemporary participatory irrigation policy and
its validating social theories, on the one hand, and the colonial dis-
course of kudimaramat, on the other. However, before examining
these continuities it must first be recognized that today’s community
management strategy (implemented through collaborative arrange-
ments involving NGOs and government) differs in significant ways
from earlier policies on kudimaramat and panchayats.
Firstly, there is some recognition (although less than desired) that
it is the legal enforcement of farmers’ rights over tank resources,
rather than their obligations that will encourage failing local initiat-
ive. Clear rights and legal authority to manage local resources are
increasingly the accepted correlates of successful community irriga-
tion management. In the NGO-led experimental project in Tamil
Nadu, new WUAs take contracts directly from the PWD and retain
profits which would otherwise go to private contractors. They organ-
ize construction work themselves and (in principle) maintain the
improved irrigation system with resources generated through new
community rights over tank resources such as trees, fish, silt and the
income these generate (CWR 1990: 125–32, 1991).
Secondly, it is now reckoned that specialized village institutions
(WUAs) will only be capable of managing and maintaining tanks if
20 The focus on command area development and distribution (i.e., field channel
lining) was new and followed on from work on canal systems in the 1970s
(Vaidyanathan 1992:14).
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they are initially supported with external resources. As a study of one
informal tank institution showed, ‘although ayacut (irrigated land)
associations might appear to cost the government a minimal amount,
they involve considerable cost to the cultivators’ (Meinzen-Dick
1984). In consequence, WUAs receive focused assistance in the form
of funds, technical support and training, as well as (in the CWR pilot
project) the deployment of specialized field-based teams to ‘motivate’
and organize individuals into the new collectivities. In canal irriga-
tion, government policy for the turnover of operation and mainten-
ance to users throughout the state has recently (1994) taken shape
under the World Bank assisted Water Resources Consolidation Pro-
ject in the form of a three-tier structure of farmers’ organizations
with WUAs managing irrigation at the lower levels and represented
at higher levels (IIMA/IIMA 1995).21 What is ultimately proposed
is a state-wide ‘irrigation extension’ bureaucracy to support these
farmers’ organizations (IMTI 1993b:18–9).
Thirdly, a new principle, namely equity, is introduced (at least in
the experimental tanks, but in principle more widely): WUAs are
expected to manage tank resources and distribute the benefits pro-
portionately to all ‘stake holders’—large and small farmers, tenants,
landless labourers and members of different castes.
While the experimental strategies for tank (and canal) irrigation
transfer in Tamil Nadu display profound change in concepts of
community management, and are also subject to recent influences
from discourse of community development, participation and
empowerment (as well as new forms of democratic accountability),
the underlying problems that tank systems present to a centralized
irrigation administration, the bureaucratic rationale for promoting
village level institutional solutions and the conception of village soci-
ety which underlie these solutions, all share much with colonial
times.
For one thing, handing tank management over (or back?) to
farmers’ institutions is still primarily and officially viewed as a means
to ease the financial burden of government in managing widely scat-
tered and small-scale systems, by ensuring better (and local) system
maintenance. If ‘customary’ kudimaramat institutions played an
important part in the extension of a state irrigation bureaucracy in
21 A Public Works Department Govt. Order (Ms. No. 1184, dated 23.11.94) dir-
ects the turnover of distributary level operations and maintenance on canal systems
from the Public Works Department to Farmer Councils. Such an order for tank
systems is awaited.
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the late nineteenth century (effectively indicating the limits of gov-
ernment resources and state control), then farmers’ organizations
have a parallel significance (worldwide) in the reverse ‘rolling back’
of state bureaucracy that is occurring in the late twentieth century
in response to performance deficiencies of state-managed systems,
fiscal crises and donor pressure. This is manifest in policy reforms
directed at the removal of state subsidies for irrigation, at promoting
financial autonomy (of irrigation agencies), at cost recovery, the
enhancement of farmer involvement in operations and maintenance
and, through WUAs, incorporating farmers into the management of,
and financial liability for, local irrigation systems. (Meinzen-Dick et
al. 1994, Maloney and Raju 1994, Svendsen and Gulati 1994). It is
difficult to escape the conclusion that contemporary state planning
for minor irrigation management requires village level institutional
solutions which are socially and financially self-supporting in the
same way that the colonial Madras government needed autonomous
village tradition for tank maintenance and repair.22
The leigitimizing idiom of village tradition is also often retained
in recent tank development programmes. Indeed, the contemporary
climate of reform has given new license to the expression of enduring
ideals about the traditional village community and its irrigation
institutions among policy makers. Thus, officially promoted village
WUAs in Tamil Nadu are seen explicitly as the means for the revival
of kudimaramat as a solution to the problem of irrigation mainten-
ance (e.g. IMTI 1993b). Their promotion is, at one level, understood
as a process of recovery and the discourse of tank development is per-
vaded by the idea of lost tradition and therefore with the language
of ‘re-habitation’, ‘restoration’, ‘revival of tradition’, ‘regeneration of
farmer management’ (etc.). Further, the language of local institu-
tional development uses notions like animation, motivation, or cata-
lysts which convey the idea of retrieval of latent community
capacities.
In non-governmental and environmentalist circles the ideal sus-
tainable relationship between communities and their environment
in the past is more explicitly a goal or model for present development
(Agarwal and Narain 1989), and tank systems provide an exemplary
22 Programmes for major canal irrigation development also require village-level
solutions in the form of ‘farmer organisations’, through which cost recovery can
be effected and enhanced water rates charged (i.e., water can be sold to farmer
organisations who recover costs from individual members) (Svendsen & Gulati
1994).
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model for this (e.g., Shankari and Shah 1993). Traditional systems,
here, also provide a critique of the ‘modernising’ development strat-
egies of the centralized state, and of the dominance of technical over
social perspectives.23 The idea of ‘traditional’ irrigation management
today, then, on the one hand supports the state’s own (new) adminis-
trative regime for decentralized resource systems, but on the other,
legitimizes moves to reduce state control in favour of community
resource rights and control. In any event, the point of reference is
often the same, specifically, pre-colonial village tradition—those insti-
tutions of the local community which maintained tanks until they
were weakened by British rule.24 The ideological notions of village
autonomy implied in the establishment of farmers’ associations—
i.e., ‘farmer control’, ‘self-management’ or the elimination of middle-
men and contractors—are as much nationalist as colonial, helping
constitute ‘the well disciplined lifestyle at village level to mould and
shape ‘‘Rama Rajyam’’ at village level as dreamt by the leaders of
India such as Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’ (IMTI
1993b:11).
Indicating the ideological nature of ‘traditional’ resource manage-
ment systems does not, I should re-emphasize, mean that village-
based systems do not exist. Even though a recent review of common
property resource use in Tamil Nadu found much evidence for ‘a
powerful ideology of the existence of popular institutions of self-
government which persists even in the absence of such institutions’
(Blaikie et al.: 1985:65), other studies, including my own, demon-
strate the continuing operation of village-level systems of tank man-
agement today (e.g., Meinzen-Dick 1984; Janakarajan 1989; 1991;
Rajagopalan n.d., Mosse 1997a, 1997c) although their failure of con-
form to official expectations, about the ‘village republic’ and its cor-
porate institutions often makes them invisible (ibid.; Sengupta
1985:1931). Indeed, the generalized notion of the decline of rural
institutions continues to contribute to an under-recognition of village
systems of resource use, as it had done also in colonial times. In fact,
as in colonial times, remarkably little attention has been given to
the actual organization of indigenous tank management.
As a result, ‘traditionalised’ village tank systems are still miscon-
ceived in the image of desirable development outcomes—for
23 Perhaps it is significant that while the engineering-led PWD project is entitled,
‘tank modernisation’, NGO programmes use phrases such as ‘tank rehabilitation’ or
‘the regeneration of farmer management’ in their titles.
24 See, IMTI 1993a (passim); IMTI 1993b; DRDA & Pradan 1994.
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example, as equitable and efficient, as involving corporate organiza-
tions, as independent from external power and resources, or as isol-
ated from the wider impacts of change in caste and political rela-
tions. A corrective and, in my experience, more common picture is
provided, for example, by the process documentation reports of the
Anna University tank project, from which it is clear that pre-existing
shares (pangu or karai) systems of water distribution (on which new
WUAs have loosely been based) are often technically inefficient,
ensure unequal access to water at times of shortage and for this
reason are often the focus of local dispute (see Mosse 1995a, 1997b,
for an analytical account drawing on these sources). Indeed, such
‘traditional’ systems often function as institutions of upper caste
dominance, and are, in fact, vestiges of a much wider set of caste-
based privileges and rights over village resources. They are often
surprisingly bad at managing common resources and a dubious
model for contemporary water users’ associations (see Mosse 1997a,
forthcoming-a). But the point is not simply that notions of irrigation
tradition continue to misconceive local tank systems, but that they
do so in socially significant ways; that is, in ways which meet per-
sisting (and new) administrative needs for autonomous, self-
managed and functionally-focused systems.
A third continuity with colonial notions of community manage-
ment in south India is the conjunction of the belief in the ‘decay of
village corporate life’ with ideas about the superiority of ‘modern’
organizational forms—the desire to formalize, codify and generalize
local practice. This has long provided a rationale for ‘organizing
farmers’ into pre-defined forms of institution, recognizable as such
by officials, i.e., formal irrigation cooperatives, farmers’ societies,
water users’ associations, which, like kudimaramat in its time, meet
a variety of official expectations about the way people ought to organ-
ize themselves. The transfer of new ‘social technologies’—including
criteria for group membership, roles and offices, conduct of meet-
ings, record and account keeping (etc.)—determine new types of
social boundary and new forms of procedural efficiency. They serve
to meet the administrative needs of irrigation development agencies
(official or voluntary) by providing a means to consult with people,
to harness local leadership, mechanism to channel development
inputs, and meet (public and private sector) bureaucratic require-
ments of orderliness, uniformity, quantifyability and control.
Without denying the advantages, and necessity, of legally consti-
tuted formal irrigation organizations (e.g. their capacity to empower
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farmers in their dealings with external authority) such institutions
are often conceived in ways which provide a simplification of both
the social organization of local irrigation systems and the politics of
institutional change (ibid.). But, as with kudimaramat custom, this
simplification, uniformity and standardization are essential to a
recasting of the social organization of tank irrigation in bureaucratic
terms. The unit of administration becomes the homogenized village-
level farmers’ association reproduced, potentially, in thousands of
villagers. Here, as with the emerging colonial state of the 1860s and
70s, a centralized bureaucracy constructs and employs its own image
of tank maintenance traditions, and its own concepts of institutional
efficiency. In particular, government administration of farmers’
organizations for tank management in south India continues to
emphasize government’s concern with maintenance and falls short of
the more radical new policy on the transfer of rights in resources
(e.g. rights to collect water charges or ownership rights) or public
contracting to farmers. The state has lost little control over irriga-
tion resources. Indeed arguably, state promoted and legally consti-
tuted water management institutions will not only relieve govern-
ment of maintenance functions, but will also provide new
mechanisms to regulate rural society and extend the state’s adminis-
trative capacities.
However, as has recently been pointed out, overriding orientation
to the bureaucratic needs of officials rather than farmers has often
rendered farmers’ irrigation organizations managerially dependent
and ineffective (cf. Ostrom 1992:11) or has, at worst, eroded rather
than strengthened local collective action (e.g. Pandian 1990). Such
problems, compounded by the state retention of rights to tank
resources, are addressed in the latest trends in theorizing irrigation
institution development and by NGO initiatives in the state. In as
much as they are part of a world-wide interest in ‘turnover’, such
initiatives are informed by new theories of local irrigation institu-
tions which focus not on uniform organizational form and boundaries
(uniform rules, membership, procedures etc.) but on the context-
specific structure of incentives which determine the collective provi-
sion of rules for common resource use and which motivate strategiz-
ing individuals to commit themselves to follow them (Ostrom 1990,
1992, Tang 1992).
The analysis of institutions in terms of individual costs/benefits of
rule following (and the monitoring of co-users of a resource) rather
than timeless village tradition or model committees, is emerging at
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a time when strongly centralized state administration in many coun-
tries is under pressure from new ideologies of privatization and free
market. If, as I have argued, sociologies of village irrigation tradition
are, in a sense, shaped by particular forms of government, it may
not be surprising to see, under the global (and especially from 1991,
Indian) re-emphasis on the free market and private management,
a reformulation of old communal ideas within the irrigation policy
community. In this externally driven ideological reorientation,
farmers (or ryots—colonial tenants/subjects) become ‘users’ or
‘appropriators’, their customs and traditions become ‘social or insti-
tutional capital’, and village organizations become ‘water management
associations’ (Maloney & Raju 1994,25 Ostrom 1990). Irrigation sys-
tems in India are themselves conceived less as part of a ‘nexus of
community and land which [link] local society to the [colonial] state’
(Gilmartin 1994:1133), and more as businesses in which commercial
arrangements link clients and supply agencies.
I have no intention of critically reviewing the important contribu-
tion of the interrelated fields of public choice theory, transaction cost
economics or game theory, which are involved here, and which might
loosely be labelled institutional-economic models of ‘collective
action’. Considering, however, the commanding position in policy dis-
course which their constructions of community irrigation manage-
ment are acquiring it may be useful (a) to consider what selective
emphasis this analysis brings to bear on rural society, and, related to
this, (b) to try to account for its emerging dominance within agency
discourse on resource management, in the same sociological terms
which were used in relation to colonial notions of custom and
tradition.
On the first point, there is a concern that much of this policy-
oriented analysis carries implicit assumptions about the sufficiency
of an ‘economic’ modelling of resource use, to the exclusion of polit-
ical and cultural perspectives which may be of considerable local and
practical importance. It is true that recent work is more cautious
about the economic modelling of human behaviour. Ostrom, for
example, suggests that earlier theories of collective action built in
too many assumptions to be useful to policy (1990:191). Employing
a more open-ended set of ‘situational variables’, she proposes a
‘framework for analysing institutional choice’ rather than a particular
25 ‘Reporting on the National Workshop on Farmers’ Management in Indian
Irrigation Systems’, Hyderabad February 1992.
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(restrictive) model (ibid.:214). This qualifies but does not, however,
question the basic idea, employed in popular development discourses,
that the economics of resource use (individual costs/benefits) pro-
vides an independent principle of social organization; independent,
that is, of historically determined and culturally specific notions of
‘resources’, rights, obligations (etc.) which tie resource management
to wider social and political forms. As one detailed study of a village
tank system in Tamil Nadu, carried out in the institutional analysis
tradition, concluded
local water management activities are unlikely to be embedded in the insti-
tutions of village, caste or religion’ rather efficient maintenance, allocation,
and conflict management requires special purpose organisations of ayacut
[irrigated land] cultivators specifically for irrigation management, with
benefits from better water supply as the motive for organising
(Meinzen-Dick 1984:46).26
What is at issue here is the imposition of a narrow definition of
economic interest, utility and value, to the exclusion of the wider
range of symbolic resources and political interests involved in the
management of tanks as common or ‘public’ village resources (see
Mosse 1997c, for a discussion of these symbolic interests). The
operational success of irrigation organizations becomes narrowly
determined by factors such as the nature of the resource (its
boundedess, seasonality, visibility, etc.), the tasks to be performed
(water acquisition and allocation, system maintenance, conflict man-
agement etc.) and the distribution of benefits within the group (see
also, Wade 1987, Bagadion & Korten 1991, Uphoff 1986, Curtis
1991). These are, of course, the prime development concerns; and
the description is, after all, intended to meet criteria of policy ‘use-
fulness’ as much as those of sociological accuracy. The point is that
what policy informed by contemporary collective action theory shares
with colonial irrigation administration is precisely this separation of
village resource management from wider political relationships and
historical context. In a sense, its ‘design principles’ and its idioms
of ‘individual strategy’, or ‘social capital’ are as static, ahistorical
and apolitical as the colonial idioms of ‘tradition’ and custom. For
example, the economistic notion of social relations as ‘capital’ which
can be carefully tapped, invested or transferred to meet development
26 The quotation is selected purely for its succinctness. Meinzen-Dick’s sub-
sequent research suggests the particularity of this rather functionalist conclusion
(pers. comm.).
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ends (or wasted) (e.g., Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne 1993), implies
a static store of consensual cultural practices which comes close to
colonial ideas of ‘tradition’. Both colonial and contemporary irriga-
tion social theory divert interest of planners away from social actors
and their wider networks, take little cognisance of the fact that social
action in the context of common or public resources is markedly
political, that relations of power underlie rule conformity, or that
individual strategies are themselves mediated by social institutions
whose elements (concepts, values and meanings) are constituted in
culturally and historically specific ways (Douglas 1986). But (and
this is the next point), it is precisely by this denial of power and
history, that models of custom or collective action are able to provide
the generalizing and predictive models required as a basis for rural
administration or programme planning.
In contrast to dominant models, current lines of enquiry suggest
that the management of tank resources has rarely provided an inde-
pendent organizing force in rural Tamil Nadu, in the sense that
farmers’ relationships to irrigation water resources are not at all
isolable from their relationships with each other, mediated by insti-
tutions and idioms of caste, kinship, political office or temple honour.
Indeed, as Leach’s (1961) now classic study of tank irrigation in Pul
Eliya (Sri Lanka) showed, it is often impossible to separate out the
‘facts of property’—land and water—from political or kinship struc-
tures through which they are represented and ‘talked about’. Not
only has resource control, historically, been represented in the
idioms of caste status, political authority or temple honours (cf.
Ludden 1985, Dirks 1987) and not only do these encode dominant
interests, but also, rights in resources—in this case public water
resources—are themselves often an idiom of political relations or
social standing (Spencer 1990:100–1). In other words, land and
water in south India are not only exploitable resources but also
media through which a variety of social relations have been struc-
tured (Granda 1984:3). This is particularly evident in the case of
the public or common resources of tank irrigation. Above all, irriga-
tion tanks are social systems in which water management involves
institutions (‘indigenous’ or established by projects) defined by cul-
tural conceptions of authority, property, rights, entitlements and
obligations, and which express and are reproduced by changing social
and political relations.
In the detail of individual cases this is self-evident. Drawing on
the micro-level detailed ‘process documentation’ of the Centre for
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Water Resources researchers, I have examined the nature of one
particular village tank association as a political institution.27 It is
clear that the local tank and its supporting water users’ association
(WUA) provided resources which were not just economic, but also
political and symbolic. Not only was the water users’ association
shaped by villagers’ political strategies, but also the development
programme through which it was promoted underlined and amplified
this political significance. New resources, additional sources of pat-
ronage, and a wider ‘public’ brought by the project meant that the
WUA was, in fact, uniquely placed to articulate caste and factional
conflicts. But further, if through development interventions natural
resources also became political resources, they did so in culturally
and historically specific ways. In the village case, the political and
symbolic significance of the tank as a common property resource
rested on a particular Tamil (or south Indian) conception of the
‘public domain’ of which it was a part. The ‘public’, in this case, is
the domain of authority, of rank and caste status (cf. Price 1991). It
is the field for political strategizing. Public affairs concerning village
resources (material or symbolic; tank or temple) articulate positions
of power, social standing and caste status; and conversely provide
opportunities to challenge authority, canvass political support, to
articulate factional affiliation, or organize caste protest (see Mosse
1997a, 1997c).
From this perspective, tank institutions, their continuity and their
leadership cannot be conceptualized (as in collective action models)
primarily in terms of the benefits of reduced transaction costs of
irrigators without recourse to a very limited concept of human
agency (Mollinga 1995). As the caste conflict, factional disputes and
litigation which characterized the operation of the new WUA in the
village case cited suggest, institutional ‘crafting’ (Ostrom 1992) may
not be able to counter ‘perverse incentives’ in predictable ways (Tang
1992: 126). Where they encourage the rendering of local historical
and social factors as, at best, of secondary importance and, at worst,
as unanalysable random occurrences of marginal relevance to plan-
ning predictable outcomes, institutional analyses and their ‘design
principles’ contribute tools for planning which prove only partially
useful in practical tank development work.
27 A summary of the formation and functioning of the water users’ association of
Nallaneri village is given in Mosse 1997b. This is based on process documentation
records kept by field staff of the Centre for Water Resources from September 1988
to October 1994, and brief field visits during 1994.
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Collective action models not only tend to encourage overly func-
tionalist interpretations of institutions, but also to endorse the con-
struction of WUAs as autonomous, self-managed, and spontaneous
institutions (influenced by external factors, to be sure) but basically
internally sustained by a structure of incentives in relation to
resources use. These models define ‘community management’ in
terms of local equilibrium of steady state systems which are compat-
ible with the (global) discourse (policy and programme practice) ori-
ented towards finding community solutions to the perceived prob-
lems of state and market-based water control and management. In
fact, these notions of ‘community management’ are often rooted in
and validated by internationally funded irrigation development pro-
grammes in which programme experience, policy and theory become
mutually validating (Palmer-Jones 1995). As Palmer-Jones (1995)
points out, programme ‘success’ becomes defined in terms of the
presence of associations, or membership, or rule conformity; that is
in terms of the prescriptions of the model itself. Descriptive accounts
of community irrigation management identify characteristics of suc-
cess, which are then interpreted as generalized conditions for, or
determinants of, collective action (e.g. Tang 1992).
As a self-validating set of ideas, the policy and theory of WUAs
has little to say about situations where such institutions do not exist,
are discontinuous or how they perform by criteria of success other
than its own (e.g., productivity, ecological sustainability) (ibid.).
Another problem is that the supporting empirical material is often
derived from case studies and project-defined success stories. Some
recent commentary suggests that the still rather limited experience
with self-managed community irrigation may not be as successful
(even in its own terms) as the first enthusiastic reports suggested.
As Palmer-Jones notes, the exceptional allocations of human and
financial resources put into well publicised innovative pilot projects,
together with agency needs for good news stories, can conspire to
give a misleading picture of the performance of WUAs in the long
term, on a larger scale, or on closer examination.
In particular, community management discourse serves to mask
the considerable role of external resources and actors—community
workers, project staff, agency representatives, government officials—
in institution formation, rule consensus, enforcement, power
brokering, conflict mediation, arbitration, resource acquisition and
so forth (see Mosse 1997b). How often are the ‘incentives’ of con-
tractors, PWD officials, political leaders, NGO workers, donor repres-
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entatives, or researchers, taken into account in the crafting of insti-
tutions? And yet external power, resources and values directly and
indirectly determine the form of, and support the functioning of
WUAs (ibid.). Questions here concerning the sustainability of extern-
ally promoted ‘community management’, whether under NGO or
government programmes, remain largely unanswered.
But further, for farmers themselves, the very meaning and purpose
of new WUAs has to do with linkage to external authority. WUAs
operate as mediating institutions for access to external power and
resources (and it is by virtue of this function also that they articulate
local political conflict). Indeed, village tank management ‘institu-
tions’ in pre-colonial times—which involved land grants, titles and
rights granted by the overlord (warrior/king)—equally found their
political meaning in the articulation of links between the local village
and wider political authority (Mosse, n.d.). In common with colonial
notions of kudimaramat tradition, then, collective action theory con-
structs as ‘spontaneous’ and self-sustaining, institutional solutions
which are, in reality, conceived, imposed, and in most cases, sus-
tained by substantial external authority and resources.
The issue here is not only selectivity in description or reporting,
but also in the application of theory. What elevates the emphasis on
community management from the limited realm of organizational
policy to that of universally valid social theory is its expression in
terms of rational choice models and game theory. But, as Palmer-
Jones again points out, game theory shows that cooperation is pos-
sible, not that any particular cooperative outcome is necessary (ibid.).
I do not wish to suggest that incentive structures are not important
or that problems such as the ‘free rider’ are not real dilemmas in
local tank management. These are practically useful theoretical
acquisitions. Rather, the points that I am making are, firstly, that
rational choice modelling leaves much out, and secondly, that notions
of self-government are strongly ideological. Ideas of autonomous self-
governing community irrigation management within irrigation bur-
eaucracies today, whether founded on notions of tradition or collect-
ive action, are no less ideological than kudimaramat, and in this
sense can misrepresent as well as guide local institutional develop-
ment. Equally, (and to reiterate), my argument here does not imply
criticism of the policy goal of participatory irrigation management
(any more than the kudimaramat discussion questioned the import-
ance of understanding and interacting with farmer-managed tank
systems). Rather, it focuses on the selectivity and limitation of the
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models of community and collective action in terms of which, policy
is conceived and, practice interpreted.28
The next question to ask is, how do these particular ideas or
models (i.e., of self-governing institutions) come to have dominance
within policy making communities? The answer is, perhaps self-
evidently, that given social theories are sustained by their particular
correspondence with the concerns of given administrative or develop-
ment regimes; they acquire their validity and power from their uses
within development institutions. As Mary Douglas, drawing firmly
on the sociological tradition of Durkheim, insists, institutions classify
and make choices. Our policy problems are posed and solutions found
within institutions which:
systematically . . . channel our perceptions into forms compatible with the
relations they authorise. They fix processes that are essentially dynamic,
they hide their influence . . . they endow themselves with rightness and send
their mutual corroboration cascading through all levels of our information
system . . . problems are automatically transformed into their own organis-
ational problems. The solutions they proffer only come from the limited
range of their experience. If the institution is one that depends upon parti-
cipation, it will reply to our frantic question: ‘More participation!’ If it is one
that depends upon authority, it will only reply: ‘More authority!’ (1987:92)
The same, of course, goes for irrigation bureaucracies which have
for long depended upon local self-management or collective action
in dealing with tank irrigation. Irrigation policy ideas such as kudim-
aramat tradition and self-governing local institutions are socially
constructed, they are social facts, part of policy-making as a collective
enterprise advancing institutional interests. But these ideas rapidly
cease to be mere statements of operational strategy and become
linked to theorized bodies of knowledge about rural society and the
way it works, ‘substantiated according to the scientific standards of
the day’—whether these be commissions of enquiry on kudimaramat
presenting the observations of authorized European officers in the
Enlightenment rubric of objective science (Ludden 1993:252); or
28 Also, my argument is not intended as a contribution to a disciplinary boundary
dispute between anthropologists and economists. Firstly, many economists and the
theoretical models they employ dispense with unrealistic assumptions about people
as self-interested economic maximizers and focus on relationships between actors,
on norms, expectations and other forms of assurance, trust or habit which influence
cooperative outcomes (cf. Seabright 1993, Runge 1986). Secondly, many economists
admit the importance of complementary explanations dealing with social phenom-
ena falling outside the standard domain of economic enquiry (Vanberg 1994:6–7;
Ruttan 1986, cited in J. Kynch pers. com.).
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observations on collective action ‘solutions’ authorized by economic
models of rational choice behaviour which command the position of
dominance in contemporary development discourse. I am not sug-
gesting that development institutions (irrigation bureaucracies and
donor agencies) are the creators of social theory, merely that they
constrain and select theory, nudge the thinking of their members in
particular directions, and impose particular interpretations (ascribe
motivations etc.) on observed behaviours.
The colonization of minds by institutions is an element in the mul-
tiple relationship between power and knowledge shown by Foucault’s
work, and Foucault’s work provides a point of departure for Edward
Said’s exploration of the rootedness in imperial power of one hege-
monic form of knowing ‘the other’—orientalism. Recent Indian histor-
ical scholarship has been influenced by, but not limited to, Said’s
(1978) notion of ‘orientalism’. In particular, recent work shows that
‘Orientalism . . . is not just a way of thinking . . . [but] a way of concep-
tualizing the landscape of the colonial world that makes it susceptible
to certain kinds of management’ (Breckenridge & van de Veer
1993:6). I have tried, in this essay, to demonstrate the pertinence of
this to the tank irrigation ‘landscape’ in south India. The discourse of
kudimaramat and village tradition provides an illustration of the way
in which, as Ludden puts it ‘colonial governance constructed [a] con-
cordance between empirical evidence and social theory by weaving ori-
entalism as a body of knowledge into the fabric of administration and
law’ (1993:266). Secondly, I have suggested that the ‘colonial project
to organise and rule Indian society’ (ibid.:4), perhaps, has its contem-
porary (international) development equivalent which employs a type
of knowledge (rooted in programmes) which is, in its own way, also ‘ori-
entalist’.29 (Meanwhile, the notion of the traditional village commun-
ity and its irrigation institutions, freed from its instrumental function
under colonial government, has now been able to acquire new political
meanings within nationalist, and more recently, environmentalist
discourses).
This discussion of policy concepts and social theories finds a parallel
in literature on ‘labelling’ in development (Wood 1985a, 1985b).30
Kudimaramat or ‘user group’, are labels in the same way as ‘benefi-
ciary’ or ‘participant’ are. Labels serve to ‘stabilize the flux of life’; but
29 I am grateful to Richard Palmer-Jones for his conference paper (1995) which
also identifies ‘orientalist’ elements in contemporary irrigation development policy.
30 I am grateful to Geof Wood for drawing my attention to this parallel.
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not only this, they also change behaviour and create (or eliminate) the
realities they identify (Douglas 1987:100). The bureaucracy or devel-
opment agency has a capacity to impose the label and effect the
change. But to emphasize this power is to understate the agency of the
labelled themselves. In development contexts (and tank irrigation is
no exception) labelling directs the flow of external resources and
inputs. Given the material and political benefits (funds, political
support) to be gained through doing so, rural society often transforms
itself towards the label (ibid.). In response to the institutional develop-
ment policy aims of government and non-government organizations,
cooperative groupings of a huge variety of kinds now characterize rural
Tamil Nadu. Indeed, ‘committees’, ‘groups’, ‘societies’, ‘associations’
and ‘councils’ are increasingly seen by village actors as the legitimate
means to petition for and acquire development resources, and such
‘groups’ now appear in the absence of external interventions. As
farmers’ associations become a more central part of minor irrigation
policy in the state, the advantages and incentives of forming associ-
ations will also increase, although these will always be balanced by the
disincentive of increased external bureaucratic interference (e.g., the
unwanted auditing attention of the cooperative sub-registrar, or the
politicians’ demand for donations from the Society fund). Interest-
ingly, the effect of the kudimaramat label was exactly the reverse.
Because the label implied community obligation backed by penal sanc-
tion, it was a category of collective action which rapidly became empty;
a label from which people fled.
In Tamil village society all are not equally placed to articulate their
interests through the new institutional forms, (or to avoid coercion
under older colonial ones). There are important relations of power
(e.g., of gender and caste) at work in the ‘community construction of
community’, and an often concealed politics of ‘consensus’ rule-
making. The ability to shape rules and control new institutions, and
the ability to use these to ‘officialize’ private or group needs or social
ambitions as the village public good is itself an expression of domin-
ance (Bourdieu 1977). As already emphasized, tank institutions are
constituted by and express relations of power and authority, and these
social meanings do not disappear, may in fact be amplified, with the
establishment of new special purpose organisations, such as ‘water
users’ associations’ under the EEC tank programme (Mosse 1997b).
But equally, social dominance does not remain unchallenged by new
institutions which also provide the means to advance externally
defined development objectives such as equity, democracy and social
justice. Formal resource management institutions usually introduce
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new systems of representation, accountability and public decision
making, which involve new caste or gender roles, defined by project
equity objectives. The point is that these social changes intersect with
local caste conflicts or factional affiliation, and with strategies to chal-
lenge as well as retain caste power. In the village case referred to earl-
ier, the political nature of the formal WUA was unmistakable when it
became the focus of litigation which halted EEC tank development
works for nearly two years (Mosse 1997b). So, institutions of water
management are continually renegotiated in ways which bring into
play public honour, caste status and political ambition, as well as the
need for a secure water supply. They are part of the success and failure
of the reproduction of local social dominance. The policy constructions
of community institutions discussed in this paper, however, tend to
obscure these development dynamics, unless they erupt into sight
through conflict (and for this reason the analysis of conflict is especially
important). But perhaps even more importantly, today’s policy con-
structions of community management conceal the political agency of
development institutions themselves, just as notions such as kudimar-
amat concealed colonial politics. The construction of ‘apolitical’
models of rural society is itself highly political.
In focusing on the nature of knowing society in the context of
rural development policy, this paper has attempted to show that
underlying ‘social theories’ of community management are institu-
tional constraints to the recognition of those least manageable
aspects of rural society, the political and cultural. And yet, the
incorporation of analysis of power, meaning and social complexity is
especially crucial to implementing policy, and specifically to evolving
effective local strategies for institution development. The methodolo-
gical challenge which the need for such decentralized and reflexive
social analysis presents to development planning has barely been
addressed (see Mosse 1998, Mosse 1995b). For one thing, participat-
ory research methods (e.g., Participatory Rural Appraisal—PRA),
which have gained wide currency recently are weakest when it comes
to the analysis of social relationships, those relations which set the
social conditions for participation itself (ibid.). But, finally, it may be
helpful to be reminded that there are other, different, traditions of
‘collective action’—collective action as struggle and protest—in
which people’s organisation is firmly built on the critical analysis of
local structures of power and oppression.31
31 I am grateful to Geof Wood for pointing out the polarity between rational
choice models of collective action, and collective action as (political) struggle.
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